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**Peacekeeping challenges require standing, not just standby, capacities.
Time for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service**

A submission to:

The High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

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On behalf of the World Federalist Movement - Canada

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* The lead author for this submission is Peter Langille, with comments and suggestions provided by Robin Collins, Secretary WFM – Canada, and Fergus Watt, Executive Director, WFM – Canada. Dr. Langille is the author of numerous publications on UN peace operations including, most recently, *“Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment,”* International Peace Institute, October 2014, New York, and *“Preparing for a UN Emergency Peace Service,”* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 2012, New York and Berlin. An upcoming volume on *“Meeting our responsibilities: A United Nations Emergency Peace Service”* will be published later this spring.

It is time to revitalize hope and initiate a new UN service. Twenty years of pragmatic, incremental reform have not improved the UN's capacity to prevent armed conflict or to respond rapidly to complex emergencies. Over recent months, calls for bold ideas and ambitious efforts have been raised by the UN Secretary General, the Board of the UN Foundation, the US Institute for Peace and representatives of the State Department. The UN High-level Independent Panel reviewing peace operations has also heard numerous parties plead for new approaches and thinking outside the box. This proposal assumes the UN will need a service on a scale commensurate with the urgent tasks it is likely to be assigned. The UN should not be asked to improvise and make do with less on an ongoing basis.

With one development—a standing United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), effectively a first responder for complex emergencies—the Organization would finally have a rapid, reliable capacity to help fulfill four of its tougher assigned tasks. The proposed UNEPS was specifically designed to help prevent armed conflict and mass atrocity crimes, to protect civilians at extreme risk, to ensure prompt start-up of demanding peace operations, and to address human needs where other actors either cannot or will not. Furthermore, although a UNEPS would entail significant start-up and recurring costs, by comparison to existing arrangements, which encourage later, larger, longer and costlier operations, a UN Emergency Peace Service would be cost-effective.

Ten core principles characterize the UNEPS proposal. It's to be:

- a permanent standing, integrated UN formation;
- highly trained and well-equipped;
- ready for immediate deployment upon authorization of the UN Security Council;
- multidimensional (civilians, police and military);
- multifunctional (capable of diverse assignments with specialized skills for security, humanitarian, as well as health and environmental crises);
- composed of 13,500 dedicated personnel (recruited professionals, selected, trained and employed by the UN);
- developed to ensure regional and gender equitable representation;

- co-located at a designated UN base under an operational headquarters and two mobile mission headquarters;
- at sufficient strength to operate in high-threat environments; and,
- a service to complement existing UN and regional arrangements, with a first responder to cover the initial six months when MS can't deploy.

Aside from providing a military formation to deter aggression and maintain security, there would be sufficient police to restore law and order, as well as an array of civilian teams to provide essential services.

Four long-standing challenges suggest the need for a new approach.

1. Rapid Deployment

Rapid deployment is a long-standing, difficult challenge for the UN. In pointing to a persistent problem, the UN Secretary-General recently noted, “without wide-ranging and tangible support from Member States, peacekeeping missions cannot deploy quickly, operate safely and nimbly, or protect civilians across massive spaces and difficult terrain.”¹ Over the past year, slow responses to UN operations in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic raised the risks to those most vulnerable and to UN peacekeepers.² Repeatedly, UN experience has also demonstrated that slow responses also increase the need for larger, longer and costlier operations.

While rapid deployment is a shared priority within the UN, it remains a difficult process to streamline or expedite. Speaking to the difficulties, Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations also noted,

When a crisis erupts, a race against time begins where we endeavour to deploy peacekeepers to stabilize a country before the situation spirals further into cycles of violence. We continue to struggle to deploy peacekeepers in a timely manner. Enabling capacities such as engineering, air and ground transport and medical support remain critical chokepoints... While we are working to shorten this process as much as possible, a hard limitation is the willingness of Member States to prepare troops to peacekeeping missions in advance of a Security Council resolution, and ensure that they can meet UN standards.³

A long list of essential tasks makes for long response times. Delays are a near-inevitable consequence, particularly when the UN must negotiate with national governments for the use of national stand-by personnel and resources.⁴ Despite numerous reforms over the past twenty years, the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) has not provided a rapid or reliable source of support.⁵ UN deployments are routinely delayed by recurring gaps in political will, well-trained personnel, critical enablers, planning and funding, etc.

As a result, UN documents concede that, “the process of planning, mounting and deploying a new operation can take on average, from 6 to 12 months.”⁶ Even with the frequency of re-hatting existing regional operations, UN responses have slowed since the Brahimi report recommended response times of one month for a traditional peacekeeping operation or three months for a complex operation.⁷ Further, slow responses have resulted in the recurring phenomena of later, larger, longer and costlier UN operations, which diminish hope, respect and resources for the Organization.

With recent and forthcoming reforms, UN response times may improve modestly.⁸ Pledges for increased contributions should also help.⁹ Combined, these initiatives may scale back current response times of six-to-twelve months to four-to-six months, possibly three-to-five months with additional efforts. But three months is a considerable extension on any interpretation of rapid deployment; one that risks being too slow and too late to help, particularly when people are confronted by violent crises. In short, the existing arrangements, even if modified, are simply insufficient for rapid deployment.

2. Protection of civilians

World leaders agreed on a fundamental responsibility to protect civilians ten years ago at the 2005 World Summit. They have yet to agree on ‘how or with what’ to protect civilians. Once again, the options are largely limited to early warning, cooperation with regional organizations or coalitions of the willing under a lead nation. Understandably, a laudable norm encounters problems when the available means entail destruction by air strikes. Aside from fostering divisions, this approach frequently fails to help those in desperate need. A recent report from Amnesty International claims that, governments are

failing to protect millions of civilians from violence by states and armed groups, describing the global response to widespread conflict from Nigeria to Syria as "shameful and ineffective".¹⁰

Since 1999, protection of civilians has been a priority in UN peace operations, with Security Council mandates for fourteen UN peacekeeping operations including protection tasks. But the UN also confronts a protection gap, which shows few signs of fading. An internal UN report on protection of civilians from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services confirmed that peacekeeping forces seldom respond promptly to attacks on civilians and there is a persistent pattern of reluctance to use force to protect civilians.¹¹ The will to protect is limited. The training and preparation for protection is also limited. National capitals and national armed forces are averse to assume protection as a priority.

3. Prevention of armed conflict and mass atrocity crime

Last year, after conceding that, "we have not made the difference that we promised we would make –to prevent the preventable"¹², the UN Secretary-General again highlighted "the enormity of the challenge of prevention and the need to re-examine and refine our approach".¹³ Yet rather than provide the UN adequate tools for prevention, Governments world-wide continue to limit the options to early warning, mediation and cooperation with regional organizations. As a result, the UN has little capacity for preventive action and even less capacity for preventive deployment. As such, it cannot deter armed conflict. There have been too few, if any, tangible changes since the *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* reported,

The biggest source of inefficiency in our collective security institutions has simply been an unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence. The failure to invest time and resources early in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflicts leads to much larger and deadlier conflagrations that are much costlier to handle later.¹⁴

4. Addressing Human Needs

Every year millions of people are adversely affected by complex emergencies. Frequently, people are forced out of their homes and lack basic necessities like food, water, medical care, shelter and protection. In such emergencies, the UN is often

involved in restoring peace and security and in providing emergency humanitarian assistance. This challenge is not fading. According to Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, “all the evidence shows that humanitarian needs are now rising faster than our capacity to meet them”.¹⁵ In his words,

...we face significant uncertainty and serious questions about the future. We are at a crossroads. The trajectory is unsustainable. We must change the way we work and chart the road ahead. We still need to give humanitarian assistance and deploy staff quickly and efficiently to emergencies.¹⁶

As desperation increases, so do the numbers of refugees and internally displaced people.¹⁷ A number of crises now appear likely to overlap and converge.¹⁸ It’s critical that the UN has a trusted capacity to help those in greatest need, especially in situations where others either cannot or will not help.

In sum, the available arrangements will not be sufficient to address the four long-standing challenges identified.¹⁹ Rather than diminishing problems, there is added urgency to each. A UNEPS remains a relevant, timely option. A list of primary roles and ancillary tasks, as well as suggested criteria for deployment are provided in **Annex A**.

A UNEPS would be a permanent standing, integrated UN formation

To prevent, manage and transform armed conflict will require that an array of sophisticated skills and well-integrated services are immediately available within a dedicated standing formation of a legitimate, universally-respected organization.²⁰ A UNEPS would be constituted for an indefinite period and remain either in training and preparation for deployment, engaged in a UN operation or in rest and recuperation following a deployment. A standing service is the optimal means to consolidate, prepare and rapidly deploy essential services. It provides immediate access to highly-trained personnel within a central, mission-oriented, organizational structure.²¹ This should also help to streamline and expedite the long list of tasks that currently slow planning and delay deployment of operations.

A UNEPS will have to be highly trained and well equipped

Prior training for each of the service’s four primary roles and ancillary tasks, as well as contingencies, will be essential. All personnel must be provided with a common

understanding of various UN operations and objectives, as well as with intensive preparation for their specific roles and responsibilities.²²

Appropriate, modern equipment must be acquired, pre-packed and prepared for immediate deployment. Similar equipment must also be available for training.²³

A UNEPS would be ready for immediate deployment upon authorization by the UN Security Council

A UNEPS is an instrument that expands the Security Council's toolbox and options. In turn, the UN Security Council would have to agree on the development of a UNEPS and agree on its operational readiness for deployment.

Rapid deployment of a UNEPS presents an array of demanding requirements. Missing components, whether in personnel, supportive infrastructure or equipment, cause delays and lead to failures. Even the basic requirements include: an early warning mechanism, an effective decision-making process, readily available transportation and infrastructure, logistics support, adequate finances and well-trained personnel.²⁴

Seven key components will demand sustained efforts:

- *first*, all deployable personnel, equipment and supplies must be adequately prepared for prompt staging. They will be expected to stand at a high degree of readiness for deployment at very short notice. As noted, prior comprehensive training of all personnel will be a prerequisite;
- *second*, all deployable elements will require a unique degree of self-sufficiency – a capacity to operate on their own for up to 30 days. Logistic support must be built within the structure and ready for diverse conditions²⁵;
- *third*, prompt transportation to the mission area, as well as within the specific theatre of operations is essential. Strategic and tactical airlift, as well as sealift must be assured by prior arrangement;
- *fourth*, a high degree of mobility will be needed to respond rapidly over a large area. Deployed elements must be equipped for quick and secure movement. An array of vehicles will be required for protection, support and transportation;
- *fifth*, as deployments are to be of a strictly limited duration, there will be a need to ensure replacements or rotations within three- to six-months, as well as augmentation and reinforcement in the event of a serious escalation. A UNEPS must be capable of complementing other UN forces, ensuring sufficient inter-operability with those that follow-on, replace or assist;

- *sixth*, flexibility is required at various levels given the relatively broad range of potential tasks and contingencies. No one size fits all: UN responses must be tailored to various mission-specific requirements. Accordingly, UNEPS is organized in a modular structure. UNEPS elements can be separated or combined. Such a structure expands the range of choice for selecting elements essential to a particular operation. The composition can be quickly customized according to the initial assessment of requirements. There are advantages in having elements that can operate on their own, independent of the entire capability. A modular structure allows for simultaneous deployment of military police or civilian elements to different operations should the need arise; and,
- *seventh*, since another objective is to develop a more sophisticated capability, contingency planning, doctrine and training must also ensure a higher degree of flexibility at the operational and tactical level.

In sum, a UNEPS is viewed as the optimum way to eliminate the *time-gap* between a UN Security Council mandate and the long period before the actual start of a mission. Rather than plan for deployment within three- to six-months, there would be the potential to send initial elements within days, lighter elements within the week, with concurrent staging for heavier units that would follow within weeks. The long list of tasks that delay operations would be consolidated and streamlined within a coherent organization.

A UNEPS will be a multidimensional service

A multidimensional UN Emergency Service— a UN ‘911’, composed of military, police and civilian volunteers – corresponds to the diverse operational requirements of contemporary, as well as future UN peace operations. A survey of the four primary roles and ancillary tasks also suggests that the requirements, particularly the deployable elements of a UNEPS must include a combination of military, police and civilian elements. No armed force can provide the range of required services. No police or civilian elements can safely manage rapid deployment operations in a mid- to high-threat environment.²⁶ Working together, however, each contributes essential services within what would be a far more advanced and effective capability.²⁷ A multidimensional service offers a wider range of help and a more effective synergy.

A UNEPS will be a multifunctional service

UN experience in complex emergencies confirms the need to provide security while addressing human needs with essential services as promptly as possible. To attract broad support and respect, a UN service must be multifunctional – capable of diverse assignments – with specialized skills for dealing with conflict, humanitarian, health and environmental crises.²⁸

While the first objective of a UNEPS is to address immediate needs and operate as the first into, and the first out of, an operation, its reception will depend on the extent to which it establishes the groundwork for further efforts.²⁹ Getting off to a good start early may also determine the prospects, size and expense of subsequent efforts.

With the wider range of emergency services available, the wider range of problems that may be addressed. A multi-functional service should be more appealing to a wider range of parties, in theatre and abroad. This should also increase its value and cost-effectiveness. Further, with the capacity to help in various missions, there is far less prospect of being idle or under-utilized.

A UNEPS will be co-located at a designated UN base under an operational headquarters and two mobile mission headquarters; (aka: coherent formation)

If UN responses are to be rapid, there is a need for a dedicated facility from which to plan, prepare and deploy future operations. A UN base is the appropriate way to consolidate the personnel, equipment, and combined effort required.³⁰

A critical requirement, which should coincide with the development of the UN base, is *the establishment of an expanded, static, operational-level headquarters*. Together, this headquarters and base could serve as a focal point for recruitment, contingency planning, doctrinal development and the training of military, police and civilian elements.³¹ An example operational headquarters is outlined in **Annex B**.³²

The operational headquarters would be expected to ensure that *two tactical-field headquarters (mission headquarters)* were fully functional and capable of assuming operational control over one of the two formations of deployable elements.³³ An example of the deployable elements, including the mission headquarters is outlined in **Annex C**.³⁴

A UNEPS will be composed of 13,500 dedicated personnel

Overall, a total of approximately 13,500 personnel would be required to ensure rapid and effective deployment to each of the four primary roles.³⁵ The projected size, composition and modular formation allow deployments to be scaled up or down and tailored to address mission-specific requirements.

A UNEPS is to provide the UN with its own dedicated service, composed of individuals volunteering for UN service.³⁶ People would be selected on the basis of merit, advanced skills and dedication to the principles within the UN Charter.³⁷ It should not be difficult to recruit sufficient people with the military, police and civilian skills, qualifications and dedication required.³⁸ Those who volunteered and met the criteria would be directly employed by the UN, with a status similar to the UN Guards and UN Civil Servants.³⁹

The benefits of UN volunteers are understood.⁴⁰ Clearly, this would help to offset the political pressure many contributing governments face when confronted with decisions about whether to participate in potentially high-risk operations.⁴¹ As Canada's study on UN rapid deployment noted, "UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid reaction capability. Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response times significantly, and volunteers could be deployed within hours of a Security Council decision."⁴² Ultimately, the report acknowledged, a UN rapid reaction capability can be truly reliable only if it no longer depends on Member States of the UN for the supply of personnel for peace operations.⁴³

A UNEPS will be at sufficient strength to operate in high-threat environments

With a higher incidence of conflicts that necessitate Chapter VII mandates, including robust rules of engagement, a UN Emergency Peace Service will require military credibility, as well as highly-developed police and civilian elements. As proposed, it is to be a robust, mobile, sophisticated capability sufficient to manage the start-up phase of demanding UN operations. Two brigade groups under two mission headquarters would be available. Each would have ample deterrent capacity. The deployable elements under each mobile mission headquarters correspond to the requirements for mission start-up of a demanding UN operation.⁴⁴

A UNEPS is no panacea or cure all. It is limited by size, design and purpose. Clearly, it is not for, nor capable of, war-fighting, mid-to-high intensity combat or large-scale enforcement operations. But that should not foreclose on its prospect to help even with larger, demanding operations. As proposed, a UNEPS has sufficient capacity to deter substantive opposition and aggression, to manage protection operations and to help in securing safe havens, buffer zones and humanitarian corridors.

A UNEPS would ensure regional and gender equitable representation

A UNEPS is to be a cosmopolitan capacity. As such, it must be representative of ‘we the people’, drawing equitably from every region. To facilitate political approval and enhance legitimacy, the criteria for recruitment should emphasize broad geographical representation. Dedicated UN elements must be of a heterogeneous composition with no distinct national representation.

Similarly, a UNEPS is to ensure gender equity within all aspects of the service.⁴⁵ Gender equity is a priority now mainstreamed in UN peace operations.⁴⁶ The UN Security Council has repeatedly called for increasing participation of women.⁴⁷

A UNEPS is to complement existing UN and regional arrangements

As proposed, a UNEPS is a first responder for the initial start-up period of demanding operations. It complements the current troop and police contributing countries by providing the services required immediately in the three- to six-months before Member States are ready to contribute. A UNEPS can only work when there is an assurance of reliable follow-on support, rotations, augmentation or extraction.⁴⁸ The existing regional arrangements and national contributors would remain essential to UN peace operations.⁴⁹

A UNEPS would be cost-effective

A UN Emergency Service composed of volunteers would inevitably entail major start-up and recurring costs. Given a full complement of 13,500 personnel, the start-up costs would likely be in the range of \$3 billion (U.S.), with annual recurring costs of approximately \$1.5 billion, and incremental costs for field operations of approximately

\$1.2 billion.⁵⁰ These costs would likely be shared proportionally among 193 Member States as part of each nation's assessed share of the UN regular budget.⁵¹

On first impression, such an investment may appear as an unwarranted expense, particularly with a zero growth budget, austerity and calls to 'do more with less'. Yet considerable experience and related research suggests a more pro-active, early, preventive approach may save millions of lives and billions of dollars.⁵² Arguably, a UNEPS would help to prevent the escalation of volatile conflicts; to deter groups from armed violence; and to cut the size, the length and frequency of UN operations. Even with success in just one of those areas, it would provide a substantive return on the investment. By comparison to the existing arrangements, which encourage later, larger, longer and costlier operations, a UN Emergency Peace Service should be far more cost-effective.

The idea of a dedicated standing UN Emergency Service stemmed from the national studies and multinational initiative to develop UN rapid deployment capability following the Rwandan genocide. In 2000, the World Federalist Movement—Canada initiated supportive research and educational outreach, in efforts which are ongoing.

A UNEPS has the potential to be very popular world-wide (sample endorsements are provided in **Annex D**). At an experts conference in Cuenca, Spain, representatives of diverse sectors in the South and the North agreed that the concept of a UNEPS was more appealing; that the multi-dimensional / multifunctional model was more appropriate and, as a result, it was deemed to have more political potential. Unlike a force or army, it is far tougher to oppose providing others with legitimate UN emergency services.

It's common sense: useful emergency services are the key to legitimate intervention; rapid deployment is essential to protecting civilians and reducing the need for late, larger and more costly efforts; a modest UN deterrent is one of the keys to preventing armed conflict and atrocity crimes; and, addressing human needs, particularly when help is most needed, may be critical to the prospect of a more cooperative future. Further, individuals recruited globally on the basis of merit and dedication to the UN, well-trained, equipped and paid by the UN into a cohesive UN formation are more likely to perform assigned UN tasks at a higher level of reliability, rapidity and effectiveness. A

UNEPS would set a higher standard, complementing wider efforts to improve peace operations.

The prevailing political environment has yet to respond adequately to the significant challenges facing UN Peace Operations. But developments will demand new approaches and ambitious efforts. It is also worth recalling an earlier observation from William Frye's study of *A United Nations Peace Force*:

Establishment of a small, permanent peace force, or the machinery for one, could be the first step on the long road toward order and stability. Progress cannot be forced, but it can be helped to evolve. That which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next.⁵³

Clearly, what's bold today may be the beginning of something better for the years ahead.

Annex A: List of primary roles for a UN Emergency Peace Service:

- Prevention of armed conflict and mass atrocity crimes;
- Protection of civilians;
- Prompt start-up of demanding peace operations
- Addressing human needs

List of potential tasks:

Advisory

- to provide early technical reconnaissance, an assessment of the situation and first-hand information for the Security Council and Secretariat to enhance informed decision-making;
- to report on initial stages of the mission, identifying potential problems, options and requirements;

Preventive Action

- to deter armed conflict and mass atrocity crimes;
- to prepare for rapid deployment and preventive deployment;
- to provide a UN presence in the crisis area immediately after the Security Council has decided it should be involved;
- to stem the escalation and/or spread of violence;
- to dissuade (and where necessary disarm) those engaged in hostilities;
- where necessary, to intervene to counter imminent attacks;

Protection of Civilians

- to provide safe areas for civilians at high risk;
- to secure humanitarian corridors;
- to expand a safe environment within the theatre of operations;

Peacekeeping

- to ensure prompt mission start-up;
- to provide an integrated vanguard for a follow-on UN operation;
- to secure area of operations, develop base, communications, airfield and mission HQ;
- to support peace processes, consolidate and enforce peace agreements;
- to separate belligerents or potentially volatile factions;
- to assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;
- to initiate quick impact projects, DDR operations, and early peacebuilding efforts;
- to provide an immediate strategic reserve to shore-up operations in trouble;

Policing

- to establish a presence that restores respect for law and order;
- to commence training of local police;
- to conduct routine patrols and investigations;
- to apprehend those suspected of war crimes;

Peace Building and Conflict Resolution

- to coordinate consultations with local parties over the options for conflict resolution;
- to establish a framework for UN efforts to negotiate a settlement between representative parties;
- to provide assistance in situations of failed states where appropriate governance is absent;
- to facilitate prompt reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation programs;
- to identify, advise and assist with problems pertaining to health, the environment and social welfare;

Humanitarian Assistance

- to maintain communication and contact with humanitarian relief and refugee organizations;
- to support and secure humanitarian relief operations; and,
- to initiate and provide such assistance when other sources are unavailable or at high risk.


Criteria for Deployment

- Authorization from the UN Security Council;
- Just cause: a complex emergency, with an immediate threat of armed conflict or mass atrocity crimes;
- Right intention: legitimate rapid and preventive deployment to address the four primary roles.
- The means employed must be proportional to and consistent with the ends sought;
- A reasonable prospect of success: a clear & viable mandate with appropriate ROE & SOFAs;
- A reliable assurance of augmentation, prompt arrangements for follow-on, rotation or extraction within six months, as well as sufficient support throughout the operation.

Annex B

Operational Level
 UN Emergency Peace Service
 Permanent Operational Level
 Headquarters and Base

Personnel:
 270 MIL
 40 POL
 1540 CIV



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MSN HQ Includes:

- Military, Police and Civilian Staff
- Political and Legal Advice
- Translation/Comms/Signals/Intell.
- Defense & Security Platoon
- NGO Liaison Team

Annex C. Composition of Deployable Elements for a UN Emergency Peace Service

(assume 2 MHQ with 2 complete formations)
(assigned to UN Base under a Static Operational HQ and 2 Missions HQs)

Total Personnel in Each: MIL 5000, CIV 610, POL 400

Deputy/SRSG

Military&Police Commander

MIL-1 x 250 Pers

CIV-1 x 20 Pers

POL- 1 x 20 Pers



Annex D: UNEPS sample endorsements

This venture is of the greatest importance both to the UN as a responsible institution and to the millions as of yet unknown, innocent victims who might, in the future, be saved by this essential addition to the UN's capacity to act on their behalf. There is one overwhelming argument for the United Nations Emergency Peace Service. It is desperately needed, and it is needed as soon as possible. –**Sir Brian Urquhart, Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs**

The barbarism the world has witnessed in the summer of 2014 cannot be allowed to define our time. I believe a permanent, highly-trained UN Peacekeeping Force, capable of rapid deployment by the Security Council in emergency situations, has now become essential... A UN emergency peace service – what might be called an international “911” – would, if established, protect civilians and prevent regional conflicts from turning into wars. We must express our global citizenship by protecting the most vulnerable in the global community. This is a path to the culture of peace. –**Douglas Roche, Former Ambassador for Disarmament, Senator and Parliamentarian**

Peacekeeping has been one of the most significant ‘inventions’ in the search for containing and resolving some of the world’s most violent conflicts. It has evolved over many decades to adapt to the complex challenges presented by the many civil wars we have suffered since 1945. Despite its faults, we should not underestimate its achievements. Neither should we be complacent about the challenges ahead in responding to the violent conflicts now destroying lives and communities. The proposed United Nations emergency peace service is a more comprehensive and legitimate model – combining military capability with enhanced conflict resolution and peacebuilding expertise. Such a creative credible and pragmatic innovation is now a top priority for all who want to live in a cosmopolitan world where all are secure. –**Tom Woodhouse, Professor of Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, UK**

If the objective is to protect people and prevent violence you send a legitimate credible UN presence to start a mission quickly- not wait for 4 to 6 months - then there is far less likelihood of people being murdered, or large scale massive ethnic cleansing. That suggests a dedicated UN mechanism including a range of services- military, police and civilian and capable of using force even when opposed to it - an entity that Peter Langille has called a UN Emergency Peace Service... –**Lloyd Axworthy, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General**

The UNEPS initiative has the potential to become the most important step towards setting up the necessary hard core element for operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect in cooperation with regional rapid deployment capabilities, and thus, of the regime for effective prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity as part of the emerging encompassing global regime for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. **Dr. Detlev Wolter, Author and Consul General**

This initiative directly responds to the widely recognized need to protect people caught in deadly conflicts. I pleaded on numerous occasions for the rapid deployment of specialized forces. Effective, trained and specialized standing forces would have been invaluable.—*Sadako Ogata, Former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*

The repeated experience of recent years, with conflicts and crises in so many countries, is that the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service is greatly overdue. The lack of a truly collective capability is a glaring limitation for the United Nations Organization and needs urgently to be rectified. Experience across the world, not least in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, shows that a thoroughly professional standing force capable of a wide range of properly sanctioned rapid interventions could be of persistent value, not least in helping prevent crises escalating into major conflicts.—*Professor Paul Rogers, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK*

With regard to practical tools--if you like the “tool of response”...there are many ideas on the table. But I believe one idea on the table that should be pursued more seriously and discussed within the United Nations, maybe a mandate if need be, is an idea which is being proposed by a very serious group of scholars and organizations. They call this the UN Emergency Peace Service. We can discuss this more fully later; I think this is something that should be debated more seriously so that where there is an actual genocide going on, at an early stage there will be the tool for response which does not depend on individual Member States deciding to send their men and women into harm's way or not to do so.—*Olara Otunnu, Former UN Special Representative to the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict*

Rather than await the next tragedy, together, we could take one confident step toward saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Together, we could help the UN prevent armed conflict and protect civilians at risk. Together, we could finally provide the Organization with a reliable mechanism for responding rapidly and effectively to diverse emergencies worldwide. Together, we could initiate a dedicated UN Emergency Peace Service. With sufficient support, such a service would complement efforts to overcome an increasingly divided, dangerous and heavily armed world. As a mechanism for enforcing international law, it would be a positive step toward ensuring a rules-based system; one that worked to promote common, human security. Gradually, it should also help to undermine the anarchy, the culture of impunity and the growing exclusivity characteristic of contemporary international relations. A UN Emergency Peace Service would be a permanent UN formation, maintained at high readiness with pre-trained, well-equipped personnel, available for immediate deployment once authorized by the UN Security Council. This service would be both multidimensional and multifunctional, composed of military, police and civilian elements, prepared for rapid deployment to diverse UN operations... I won't go into all the details of this proposal today, but it is supported by a coalition of organizations and detailed in a book published by the Center

for UN Reform entitled, Bridging the Commitment—Capacity Gap.., a terrible title but a wonderful book written by Dr. Peter Langille.— *Don Kraus, Executive Director, Citizens For Global Solutions*

Endnotes

¹ “Rapid response, including troops and the ability to get them to the right place at the right time” is at the forefront of six critical necessities. The other five critical necessities highlighted by Ban were: greater mobility, above all, through helicopters; strengthen medical support; better protection against improvised explosive devices (IEDs); improved information and analysis, including expertise on organized crime; strong partnerships with regional organizations, particularly in Africa, where many peacekeeping operations are deployed alongside African Union and sometimes the European Union. See, “Secretary-General’s remarks at Summit on UN Peacekeeping”, New York, September 26, 2014. Available: <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8060>

² Participants at the 2014 summit on UN peacekeeping heard that, “rapid deployment, as we know, is critical, a challenge we have seen all too well in the UN missions in Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.” As Ambassador Pressman noted, “it has been 10 months since the Security Council authorized an emergency increase in troops to stem the violence in South Sudan, and yet the mission is still not at full strength. In Mali, a year and a half after the UN assumed authority from the AU, the mission is only at 74% of its full operational capacity. In the Central African Republic, Special Representative of the Secretary General Gaye reported earlier this month that MINUSCA is at 65% of its military strength and 49% of civilian capabilities some seven months after the mission was authorized. These timelines must shrink because peoples’ lives and peace hangs in the balance.” See, Remarks by Ambassador David Pressman, U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, at a Fourth Committee Debate on Peacekeeping, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York, New York, October 31, 2014. Available: <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/11/20141101310557.html?CP.rss=true#axzz3K13ORp9q>

³ Hervé Ladsous, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, “*New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping*”, Challenges Annual Forum 2014, Peacekeeping Centre of the Ministry of National Defence of China, October 14, 2014, p. 7. Available: http://www.challengesforum.org/Global/Forum%20Documents/2014%20Beijing%20Annual%20Forum/Keynote_Haeri.pdf?epslanguage=en

⁴ The diverse impediments to, and need for a better UN system, for rapid deployment are more fully covered in H. Peter Langille, “Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment,” *Providing for Peacekeeping*, no. 8, New York: International Peace Institute, October 2014. Available: <http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/440-improving-united-nations-capacity-for-rapid-deployment.html>

⁵ The UNSAS is a conditional arrangement that depends on national approval for the use of valued national resources; conditions that frequently render it undependable. The UNSAS has been revised with numerous reforms and allowed to continue, despite a recurring tendency to stand-by when most needed. The UNSAS and partnerships may become useful resources for peacekeeping, but repeat experience has demonstrated they are neither rapid nor reliable in more pressing emergencies. For an excellent overview of the UNSAS see, Adam C. Smith, Arthur Boutellis, and Bianca Selway, “Evaluation of the UN Force Generation System Part I: An Analysis of the UN Standby Arrangements System,” Final Report to the Division of Policy Evaluation & Training and the Office of Military Affairs, DPKO, International Peace Institute, March 20, 2012. Also see, Langille, “Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment”, pp. 4-7.

⁶ UN Department of Field Support, *Global Field Support Strategy*, available in United Nations Secretary-General, *Global Field Support Strategy*, UN Doc. A/64/633, January 26, 2010, para. 10.

⁷ Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, para. 89, p. 15.

Notably, this Brahimi recommendation included the following proviso:

In order to meet these timelines, the Secretariat would need one or a combination of the following: (a) standing reserves of military, civilian police and civilian expertise, materiel and financing; (b) extremely reliable standby capacities to be called upon on short notice; or (c) sufficient lead-time to acquire these resources, which would require the ability to foresee, plan for and initiate spending for potential new missions several months ahead of time.

As progress on (a), (b), and (c) remain elusive, the recommended response times are seldom met and are now considered a notional target. The UN's progress on rapid deployment continues to be impeded by the limited choices available. The Brahimi Report pointed to persistent problems:

Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations "rapidly and effectively" within the timelines suggested.

⁸ Seven recent initiatives are likely to restore support. As noted, "progress is evident in the standby arrangements system (UNSA), the formed police unit standby initiative, the standing police capacity, the new system for reimbursements and premiums, the Global Field Support Strategy, and partnerships for rapid deployment." There will be further pressure to improve partnerships. New financial incentives in the form of risk premiums and premium payments for critical enablers provided rapidly should help encourage MS who need the money. These may also help regional partnerships such as the AU ACIRC. Similarly, the Global Field Support Strategy should improve UN supply and logistics. See, H. P. Langille, "Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment", p.1.

⁹ In 2014, a number of governments responded favorably to the UN and American appeal for increased contributions. For an impressive list of new pledges see, U.S. White House, "Fact Sheet: Summit on UN Peacekeeping" September 26, 2014. Available: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/26/fact-sheet-summit-un-peacekeeping> Also see, J.C. Findley, "Joe Biden convenes U.N. summit on peacekeeping" *UPI News*, September 26, 2014. Available: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/09/26/Joe-Biden-convenes-UN-summit-on-peacekeeping/6871411738701/#ixzz3Jx6jFWxH

¹⁰ Kieran Guilbert, "States fail to protect civilians from militant violence – Amnesty", *Reuters*, Feb 25, 2015. Available: <http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/25/global-violence-war-idINKBNOLT0CL20150225>

As noted, "a year of catastrophic violence had led to one of the worst refugee crises in history, as the number of displaced people worldwide topped 50 million for the first time since the end of the World War Two, the rights group said in its annual report."

¹¹ UN, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, "Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations", UN Doc. A/68/787, March 7, 2014. Cited in Michelle Nichols, "U.N. study finds peacekeepers avoid using force to protect civilians," *Reuters*, May 16, 2014. Notably, the OIOS report was the second substantive UN review of protection of civilians. It studied eight peacekeeping missions whose mandate included protecting civilians.

¹² At Brussels conference, Ban spotlights crisis in Central African Republic," *UN News Center*, April 2, 2014

¹³ Cited in “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2171 (2014), Pledges Better Use of System-Wide Approach to Conflict Prevention”, (SC/11528), August 24, 2014. Available: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11528.doc.htm>

¹⁴ *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, UN Doc. A/59/565, December 2, 2004, para. 39, p. 23.

¹⁵ As reported, “the extraordinary levels of crisis around the world recently prompted the UN to appeal for a record \$16.4 billion for 2015 to provide assistance for 57.5 million people who “experienced unimaginable suffering.” See, “UN Asks for US\$16 billion for Humanitarian Aid in 2015”, *telesur*, December 9, 2014. Available: <http://www.telesur.tv/english/news/UN-Asks-for-US16-billion-for-Humanitarian-Aid-in-2015-20141209-0006.html>

¹⁶ Jan Eliasson, “Deputy Secretary-General’s Opening Remarks for the Third Annual Global Humanitarian Policy Forum”, New York, December 3, 2014. Available: <http://www.un.org/sg/dsg/statements/index.asp?nid=581>

¹⁷ The desperate situation of 12.2 million people within Syria reflects a larger problem evident in Iraq, Libya, Gaza, Darfur, South Sudan and elsewhere. Who will help? Access into high-risk areas of armed conflict is dangerous, frequently impeding delivery of humanitarian assistance. In such circumstances, the Organisation faces an up-hill struggle in addressing the basic needs of destitute refugees and internally-displaced people.

For an overview of the situation in Syria see, Edith M. Lederer, “UN: 12.2 Million Syrians Need Humanitarian Aid”, Huffington Post, December 1, 2014. Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/26/un-syria-aid_n_6225102.html

¹⁸ The frequency and cost of disasters is also spiraling up. Margareta Wahlstrom, head of the UN office for Disaster Risk Reduction acknowledges a worrisome shift: “everywhere, things are going on that didn’t go on 10 years ago... Expect events to happen that you have never seen before. There will be no letup in the coming decades.”

Cited in Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Disaster Chief Warns of More Natural Catastrophes to Come”, *The New York Times*, December 23, 2014. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/world/un-disaster-chief-warns-of-more-natural-catastrophes-to-come.html?_r=0

¹⁹ The UN retains a ‘gap list’ to identify immediate needs in peace operations. Understandably, the larger enduring gaps, needs and implications are overlooked on the list. The following gaps are recognised, but accepted as an immutable condition for the Organisation:

Lacking a service of its own, the UN is reliant on the conditional co-operation of member states;
Lacking a rapid deployment capacity, the UN will remain slow and late;
Lacking well-trained and well-equipped troop and police units, the UN deploys what is available;
Lacking an instrument to protect civilians, the UN is reliant on coalitions of the willing;
Lacking the means to prevent, the UN can't do more than mediate with diplomacy;
Lacking a police force of its own, the ICC is reliant on the co-operation of its member states;
Lacking hope and means, there is the default choice of delegating responsibility to regional organizations.

²⁰ The roles and requirements were initially within the agreed background book for the UNEPS initiative. See H. Peter Langille, *Bridging the Commitment—Capacity Gap: A Review of Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment* (Wayne, N.J.: Center for UN Reform Education, 2002). For the UNEPS proposal of the American-led UNEPS initiative, see Robert C. Johansen, (ed.), *A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, Global Action to Prevent War, The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the World Federalist Movement, (New York, WFM-IGP, 2006).

²¹ UN policy elaborates on the definition of “standing” and its distinction from standby arrangements. As noted,

“Standing: to be continually engaged at all times in fulfilling core functions, while also maintaining the ability to rapidly redeploy to start up new activities and subsequently return to the respective duty station for follow-on assignments as required. Standing mechanisms are to be distinguished in particular from standby arrangements, which refer more commonly to those bodies that possess an on call faculty and a pre-determined and /or lengthier reaction and deployment time.” See, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Functions and Organization of the Standing Police Capacity,” Policy Ref. 2012.12, January 1, 2013, para. 34, p. 11.

²² Clearly, a comprehensive training system will be required to ensure competence, high standards, cohesiveness, as well as interoperability with other UN forces. Such a system would include general, specialized and mission-specific training programs, including modern training courses and a wide range of curricula. At the outset, there would also be a need for language courses to ensure all personnel were proficient with the two working languages of the UN (English and French), as well as familiarity with the languages in areas where deployments were likely.

²³ Ultimately, the UN will require its own equipment if the deployable elements of a new capability are to be rapid, interoperable, standardized. Standardization of equipment (particularly with respect to vehicle fleets) would greatly reduce overall costs, manpower, overhead and efficiency. To illustrate, one set of costly equipment, such as helicopters and armoured vehicles, might be shared in training, while a second similar set was being used in a mission or being pre-packaged ready for immediate deployment. Further, to ensure protection, situational awareness and mobility throughout its area of operations, a UNEPS must have its own enablers. Overall, this would entail roughly thirty percent more equipment than might be required for two high-readiness, brigade-size formations. Although concerns would arise over substantive acquisition costs, the complex job of coordinating and maintaining appropriate equipment for training and missions might be considerably less taxing.

²⁴ For further elaboration see, Government of Canada, *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 21-24.

²⁵ Notably, the three- to- one ratio of logistic support units required for deployed personnel is often scaled back for lighter rapid deployment formations. Further, the Department of Field Support recently devoted over five years to a Global Field Support Strategy primarily to ensure prompt support for rapid deployment. With the DFS and GFSS developing global and regional service centres, strategic deployment stocks for mission start-up and modular pre-fabricated camps, the additional logistic requirements are now largely available. A UNEPS may only require 15-to-30 days of self-sufficiency. The initial plans for a UNEPS entailed a need for a longer period of self-sufficiency (three months) and a larger percentage of logistic support being provided by non-deployed, identical elements under the second mission HQ at the UN base. These recent developments may facilitate a larger deployment of UNEPS at the combined strength of both Mission Headquarters (approximately 11,800) or the concurrent and possibly simultaneous deployment of both either to one or two operations.

²⁶ The earlier notion of using a stronger civilian police force as the lead and primary element for rapid deployment is viewed as a dangerous fallacy. To date, there are no police forces that are trained to operate on their own in a hostile environment or to start a UN mission. There are no police forces equipped and prepared to ensure their own self-defense when directly confronted by military opposition. Moreover, recent experience suggests the need for a fairly ‘robust’ deterrent capability at the start of an operation when the first UN elements are likely to be seriously tested by the armed belligerents (military and paramilitary) engaged in the conflict. This initial test tends to be a determining factor for the future success of the mission. Even the use of light infantry is often discouraged, despite their capacity for very rapid deployment as they have restricted mobility in theatre and are seldom equipped with the armored vehicles that are necessary for their own protection and the security of the operation.

²⁷ With an integrated multidimensional service, a UNEPS can provide a more comprehensive response to violence at various levels. Military elements are needed to deter and stop direct violence. Humanitarian assistance, medical and civilian peacebuilding teams are often critical to address human needs and counter

structural violence. Public information units and human rights monitors and educators help to stem cultural violence. Conflict resolution and mediation teams can help at every level. Together, by minimizing direct, structural and cultural violence, they improve the prospects for more positive and enduring peace.

²⁸ A UNEPS includes relatively small teams of those with expertise in disaster, humanitarian, health and environmental crises to plan and coordinate a coherent response from others within the service, the UN or supportive organizations. This draws on extensive national experience where similar small units are now commonly used to plan and coordinate larger operations.

²⁹ For example, at the outset of a mission, protecting civilians may be the first priority, but such activities may have to be accompanied by protection of the environment and reconstruction of critical infrastructure. Simultaneously, there must be an ongoing commitment to, and assistance for, peace building over the short, mid and longer-term.

³⁰ Aside from accommodating personnel, the base would have to assist in the organization of the service, the recruitment of volunteer personnel and their preparation into cohesive elements. It would also serve as a central training, logistics, staging and equipment stockpiling centre.

³¹ Among its anticipated tasks an operational-level headquarters would: forecast detailed requirements; coordinate police, civilian and military aspects of operational planning; confirm standing operating procedures; assist with equipment procurement and stockpiling; establish readiness and training standards; promote interoperability; and develop training curricula and courses. It might also assume responsibility for deployment of its assigned mission elements, thereby easing the burden on UN Headquarters.

³² ? A headquarters of this nature would, by necessity, be quite large. The example provided estimates a military requirement for approximately 203 personnel not including the base infrastructure and support staff. This number is partly accounted for given the need for a 24/7 operations cell to initiate a rapid response and immediate planning in the event of a pending crisis. As this headquarters assumes responsibility for the details of reconnaissance, force composition and deployment, a 24/7 operations cell will be critical. The civilian component within this headquarters is projected at 83 personnel (not including base infrastructure). These civilians will be required to ensure a comprehensive approach in the planning of multidimensional operations and to develop the integrated unity of effort, which must typify UN peace support operations of the future.

³³ Once deployed, these mission headquarters could be placed under the direction of a Deputy Representative of the Secretary General (DRSG) supported by military and police commanders. Both headquarters would include police, military and civilian staff, political and legal advisors, a translation cell, an NGO liaison team, as well as units for communications, signals and intelligence and a defence and security platoon. Both would be multidimensional headquarters with approximately 295 personnel with the capacity to act as a vanguard HQ, a sector HQ, or a mission HQ for a limited period of time.

³⁴ The deployable military elements assigned to each mission HQ would include: high-readiness, technical reconnaissance units; a light-armored reconnaissance squadron; motorized infantry battalions; light-armored (wheeled) infantry battalions; a helicopter squadron; an engineer unit; a logistics battalion and a medical unit. The deployable civilian police elements under each mission headquarters would consist of a staff of civilian police, three Formed Police Units of 140 personnel, as well as special units for investigations and training. Among the diverse civilian elements, there would be a requirement for disaster relief and humanitarian response teams, peacebuilding teams, conflict resolution and mediation teams, medical teams, public affairs teams, an environmental crisis response team and a transport team.

³⁵ This number includes all deployable elements, base support and administration, as well as the operational headquarters. As noted, the deployable elements assigned to each mission headquarters are

identical, including a military brigade group, three companies of civilian police, as well as civilian teams with special skills.

³⁶ In the early nineties, Sir Brian Urquhart prompted a broad debate, encouraging consideration of dedicated UN volunteers in a seminal article entitled, “For a UN volunteer military force”, *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 40, no. 11, June 10, 1993. Instead of having the UN remain entirely reliant on national decision-making and national armed forces, he proposed that volunteers could be recruited, trained and prepared to respond to diverse, demanding emergencies within a dedicated UN Legion. The Netherlands’ study of a Permanent UN Brigade elaborated on the particular requirements of a discrete (5000 personnel) force for rapid deployment. It confirmed that there were no insurmountable technical impediments –that given political will and funding, a Permanent UN Brigade was feasible and that with some assistance, it would be more rapid and reliable. The Canadian study developed the core ideas for what was formerly called a UN standing emergency group and was subsequently revised as a UN Emergency Service and a UN Emergency Peace Service.

³⁷ The recruitment of volunteers for the various military, police and civilian positions could commence after a decision to establish a base and an operational headquarters. Recruiting and selecting appropriate personnel is a time-consuming process, but it should not be difficult to attract a sufficient number of excellent candidates from around the world. As well, a rigorous selection process will be required to ensure individual qualifications, high standards of expertise and experience, as well as a strong commitment to service within a new UN formation. This would entail the development of appropriate command and control procedures, specific codes of discipline, as well as new status of personnel and act of service agreements.

³⁸ The UN has had approximately one hundred thousand personnel in service at any time over the past decade, many in repeat tours of duty and, many with skills derived from extensive experience. Soldiers and officers are often attracted to UN service. Woodhouse, Ramsbotham and Miall acknowledge the similar appeal of a UNEPS writing that, “our own research suggests that these apparently ‘blue skies’ ideas now command much more support from serving military forces currently engaged in peace operations than might be supposed.” A UNEPS would endeavor to attract the best and the brightest recruits. See, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*, (third edition), (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 165.

³⁹ Remuneration, as well as comprehensive insurance and pension programs, would be based on a scale similar to that of personnel within the UN Secretariat, which provides compensation for expertise, special skills and experience. As UN employees, these individuals would be subject to disciplinary rules for all UN personnel and they would retain a legal status, which grants them immunity from the jurisdiction of the host country, as well as fiscal privileges. Status agreements would need to be concluded with the nation hosting the UN base.

⁴⁰ By drawing on dedicated professionals worldwide, the UN could screen, select and train participants to high common standards, ensuring higher readiness for various assignments. Command and control, as well as cohesion and interoperability are easier to develop in a standing formation. It would also allow the UN to tailor the composition and character of a new capability based on its own professional volunteers. A UNEPS is designed as a more sophisticated mechanism for addressing complex emergencies.

⁴¹ Notably, the 1995 report of the US Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations also recommended a UN force composed of those volunteering for service: “To strengthen the U.N.’s peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities the Commission proposes the creation of a 5,000 to 10,000(man) blue helmet rapid deployment force of volunteers... The Commission believes that a UN rapid-reaction force is necessary because no nation likes to send its soldiers into potential combat zones when its own interests may not be directly affected by the outcome... On its own (a small international force) has limited value if a large-scale conflict breaks out, but a UN legion would...be a useful arm of the Security Council for deterring conflict or providing early on-site reconnaissance. It could also be used to

give the UN an immediate presence in a troubled region while a larger force is formed using units contributed by Member Nations.”

See, James A. Leach and Charles M. Lichenstein, Final Report, “Defining Purpose: The UN and the Health of Nations,” U.S. Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993, p. 6 and 20. Cited in John G. Heidenrich, “Why U.S. Conservatives Should Support A U.N. Legion,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994, p. 21.

⁴² Government of Canada, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations, (Ottawa, 1995) p. 62.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 60. A Canadian discussion paper on the issue also acknowledges that, “it would provide the UN with a small but totally reliable, well-trained and cohesive group for deployment by the Security Council in urgent situations. It would break one of the key logjams in the current UN System, namely the insistence by troop contributing nations that they authorise the use of their national forces prior to each deployment. It would also simplify command and control arrangements in UN peace support operations, and put an end to conflicts between UN commanders and contingent commanders reporting to national authorities.” Canada, DFAIT, “Improving the UN’s Rapid Reaction Capability: Discussion Paper,” April 29, 1995, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Moreover, with two mission headquarters supported by an equal number of deployable elements, the UN would have the potential to respond to two operations annually. Two concurrent operations would be manageable if each deployment was limited to a modestly reduced size. Smaller deployments of specific elements could also be used in the initial stages of a UN operation or to provide prompt support for an ongoing mission encountering difficulties.

⁴⁵ There is no legitimate excuse; women are now deployed in all UN operations and all areas of work. There are numerous promising precedents. For example, five women currently serve as SRSG’s leading UN peace operations. Major-General Kristin Lund serves as the first female UN Force Commander in Cyprus. In January 2007, the UN deployed its first all-female Formed Police Unit to serve in Liberia.

⁴⁶ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Gender and Peacekeeping”, Available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/>
For specific policy see, DPKO Policy, Gender Equality in Peacekeeping, Ref 2010 25, July 26, 2010. Available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/gender_directive_2010.pdf

⁴⁷ Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013) call on the UN and Member States to ensure greater participation of women in UN peacekeeping missions.

⁴⁸ A UNEPS does not diminish the need for well-trained, well-equipped national contributions of personnel for UN peace operations. With an average of 16 operations over the past eight years requiring 120,000 multinational personnel, the need for national contributions is likely to remain high. For the foreseeable future, this need will also continue to challenge UN force generation and demand additional resources from the member states. Unlike many previous proposals, a UNEPS is a relatively discrete ‘gap filler’ to provide urgent emergency requirements. As such, it complements and depends upon national personnel to manage and maintain their primary roles in UN peace operations.

⁴⁹ National units listed in the UNSAS will be needed to provide a substantive pool of personnel who can rotate into operations and provide the exit opportunity for UNEPS within six months. Similarly, arrangements such as the AU ACIRC and EU battlegroups and EU Gendfor will be needed for concurrent operations and for periods of intense activity. As well, they may also provide a critical high-readiness strategic reserve for prompt augmentation of UNEPS in the event of a crisis. Further partnerships for peacekeeping are planned and needed. A UNEPS is to complement and prepare for their deployment. As Detlev Wolter writes, “implementation of these measures would not diminish the need for the UN Emergency Peace Service but enable it to function more effectively.”

See, Wolter, "The Urgent Need for a UNEPS", excerpt from *A United Nations for the 21st Century: From Reaction to Prevention*, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2007), p.3.

⁵⁰ This is deemed a rough approximation and a preliminary estimate that requires far more detailed analysis. While supporting such an option, the 1995 study of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations acknowledged that a volunteer force of 10,000 might involve annual costs of approximately \$500 million (U.S.) with a one-time start-up cost of \$500 million (U.S.).⁵⁰ See, The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, *The United Nations in Its Second Half Century*, (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1995), p.46. The Dutch study of a permanent 5000-man UN Brigade conceded that it would only be possible to provide a preliminary estimate of \$500-\$550 million (U.S) for procurement of equipment, with an annual running cost of \$300 million (U.S.).⁵⁰ See, The Netherlands Non-Paper, "A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade," p. 18. In their 1995 "Design for a 15,000-person UN Legion," Carl Conetta and Charles Knight estimated initial capital expenditures of \$1.568 million (U.S), an annual budget of \$745 million and incremental costs for field operations of \$590 million, assuming full utilization.⁵⁰ See, Conetta and Knight, "Design for a 15,000 person UN Legion," *Briefing Report 8*. Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA, October 1995. As proposed this Legion would be a heavier, strictly military force, including tanks, additional helicopters and artillery. Available: <http://www.comw.org/pda/unlegion.htm>. While these three estimates vary in relation to the projected costs, size, composition and equipment, they provide a rough illustration of the potential costs for a UN Emergency Peace Service. Notably, with inflation compounded over the past twenty years, the Conetta and Knight estimate for a 15,000 person UN Legion would now likely entail an initial expense of approximately \$2,435 million, an annual budget of \$1,157 million and incremental costs for field operations of \$917.5 million. An additional cost of approximately \$400 million would arise from the need for a UNEPS to have its own enablers, particularly helicopters for heavy transport, utility and armed reconnaissance to ensure mobility, surveillance and protection. This would likely entail a total start-up cost of approximately \$3 billion, with an annual budget of \$1.5 billion and incremental costs for field operations at roughly \$1.2 billion.

⁵¹ Alternative financing through voluntary contributions or a new global financial transaction tax have been raised as options that merit further efforts.

⁵² For further detail on cost-effectiveness see the expanded section in Langille, "Meeting Our Responsibilities: A United Nations Emergency Peace Service", forthcoming, Spring, 2015. See, Paul Collier and Bjorn Lomborg, "Does Military Intervention Work?", *Project Syndicate*, April 30, 2008. Also see, Malcolm Chalmers, "Spending to Save? The Cost-Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention," *Defence and Peace Economics* 18, No. 1 (February 2007): 1–23.

⁵³ William R Frye, *A United Nations Peace Force*, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), pp. 106-107.